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Abstract
This paper analyses the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for dis-
tributive justice in the context of social welfare orderings. An axiom capturing a liberal
non-interfering view of society, named the Weak Harm Principle, is studied, whose roots
can be traced back to John Stuart Mills essay On Liberty. It is shown that liberal views
of individual autonomy and freedom can provide consistent foundations for social welfare
judgements, in both the nite and the innite context. In particular, a liberal non-interfering
approach can help to adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergen-
erational justice. However, a surprisingly strong and general relation is established between
liberal views of individual autonomy and non-interference, and egalitarian principles in the
Rawlsian tradition.
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1 Introduction
What are the implications of classical liberal and libertarian approaches for distributive jus-
tice? Can liberal views of individual autonomy and freedom provide consistent foundations
for social welfare judgements? In particular, can a liberal non-interfering approach help to
adjudicate some fundamental distributive issues relative to intergenerational justice? What
is the relation between classical liberal political philosophy and the egalitarian tradition
stemming from John Rawlss seminal book A Theory of Justice ([49])? This paper addresses
these questions, and in so doing it contributes to three di¤erent strands of the literature.
In recent work, Mariotti and Veneziani ([46], [47]) have explored a new notion of respect
for individual autonomy in social judgements, suited for Social Welfare Orderings (hence-
forth, swos), whose philosophical roots can be traced back to John Stuart Mills essay On
Liberty. The Principle of Non-Interference embodies the idea that "an individual has the
right to prevent society from acting against him in all circumstances of change in his welfare,
provided that the welfare of no other individual is a¤ected" ([46], p.1690).
Formally, the Principle Non-Interference (or Non-Interference, in short) can be illustrated
as follows: in a society with two individuals, consider two allocations u = (u1; u2) and
v = (v1; v2), describing the welfare levels of the two agents in two alternative scenarios.
Suppose that, for whatever reason, u is strictly socially preferred to v. Suppose then that
agent 1 either su¤ers a welfare loss, or enjoys a welfare increase in both allocations, while
agent 2s welfare is unchanged, giving rise to two new allocations u0 = (u1 + "u; u2) and
v0 = (v1 + "v; v2), with "u"v > 0. Non-Interference says that, if agent 1 strictly prefers u0 to
v0, then society should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference
for v0 over u0. An agent "can veto society from a strict preference switch after a positive or
negative change that a¤ects only [her] and nobody else" ([46], p.1690).
The veto power accorded to individuals is weak because a switch to indi¤erence is ad-
mitted, and because Non-Interference is silent in a number of welfare congurations (e.g., if
agent 1s welfare changes in opposite directions, "u"v  0, or if she does not strictly prefer
u0 to v0). There are numerous non-dictatorial, and even anonymous swos that satisfy Non-
Interference. Yet, Mariotti and Veneziani ([46]) prove that, in societies with a nite number
of agents, dictatorial swos are the only ones compatible with Non-Interference among those
satisfying Weak Pareto.1 Lombardi and Veneziani ([42]) and Alcantud ([2]) have extended
this result to societies with a countably innite number of agents.
This impossibility proves the limitations of liberal approaches to Paretian social judge-
ments: there cannot be any protected spherefor individuals even if nobody else is a¤ected.
1The Anonymity and Weak Pareto axioms are formally dened in section 2 below.
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As Mariotti and Veneziani ([46], p.1691) put it, "Of the appeals of the individuals to be left
alone because nobody but me has been a¤ected, at least some will necessarily have to be
overruled." The rst contribution of this paper to the literature on liberal approaches is to
analyse a specic, ethically relevant weakening of Non-Interference and provide a series of
positive results, both in the nite and in the innite context.
To be precise, we limit the bite of Non-Interference by giving individuals a veto power
only in situations in which they su¤er a decrease in welfare. Arguably, this captures the
most intuitive aspect of a liberal ethics of non-interference, as it protects individuals in
situations where they su¤er a damage, while nobody else is a¤ected: a switch in societys
strict preferences against an individual after she has incurred a welfare loss would represent
a punishment for her.
Formally, in the two-agent example above, we restrict Non-Interference to hold in situa-
tions where "u < 0; "v < 0. We call this axiom the Weak Harm Principle - for it represents
a strict weakening of the Harm Principle rst introduced by Mariotti and Veneziani ([43])
- and show that a limited liberal ethics of non-interference can lead to consistent social
judgements.2
The implications of liberal principles of non-interference (in conjunction with standard
axioms in social choice), however, turn out to be fairly surprising. For there exists a strong
formal and conceptual relation between liberal views, as incorporated in the Weak Harm
Principle, and egalitarian social welfare relations (henceforth, swrs). The analysis of this
relation is the second main contribution of the paper.
Formally, we provide a number of fresh characterisations of widely used Rawlsian swrs.
Standard characterisations of the di¤erence principle, or of its lexicographic extension, are
based either on informational invariance and separability properties (see, e.g., dAspremont
[21]; dAspremont and Gevers [22]) or on axioms with a marked egalitarian content such as
the classic Hammond Equity axiom (Hammond [31], [32]).3
We prove that both the Rawlsian di¤erence principle and its lexicographic extension
can be characterised based on the Weak Harm Principle, together with standard e¢ ciency,
fairness and - where appropriate - continuity properties. The adoption of swrs with a strong
egalitarian bias can thus be justied based on a liberal principle of non-interference which is
logically distinct from informational invariance and separability axioms, has no egalitarian
content and indeed has a marked individualistic avour (in the sense of Hammond [33]).
2Mariotti and Veneziani ([44]) analyse di¤erent restrictions of Non-Interference and characterise Nash-
type orderings. For a related analysis of utilitarianism, see Mariotti and Veneziani ([45]).
3See also Tungodden ([59], [60]) and Bosmans and Ooghe ([15]). Similar axioms are used also in the
innite context; see, e.g., Lauwers ([37]), Asheim and Tungodden ([5]), Asheim et al. ([8]), Bossert et al.
([16]), Alcantud ([1]), Asheim and Zuber ([6]).
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This relation between liberal approaches and egalitarian swrs has been originally estab-
lished by Mariotti and Veneziani ([43]), who have characterised the leximin swo in nite
societies based on the Harm Principle. We extend and generalise their insight in various
directions.
First of all, as noted above, we focus on a strict weakening of the Harm Principle. This
is important both formally and conceptually. Formally, it has been argued that the char-
acterisation in Mariotti and Veneziani ([43]) is less surprising than it seems, because under
Anonymity the Harm Principle implies Hammond Equity (see Alcantud [2], Proposition 4).
This conclusion does not hold with the Weak Harm Principle: even under Anonymity, the
Weak Harm Principle and Hammond Equity are logically independent and the original in-
sight of Mariotti and Veneziani ([43]) is therefore strengthened. Conceptually, by ruling
out only a strict preference switch in social judgements, the Weak Harm Principle captures
liberal and libertarian views more clearly than the Harm Principle, for it emphasises the neg-
ative prescription at the core of Mills analysis of non-interference and assigns a signicantly
weaker veto power to individuals.
Further, based on the Weak Harm Principle, we also provide new characterisations of
Rawlss di¤erence principle. Compared to the leximin, the maximin swr may be deemed
undesirable because it denes rather large indi¤erence classes. Yet, in a number of settings,
its relatively simpler structure is a signicant advantage, which allows one to capture the
core egalitarian intuitions in a technically parsimonious way. Moreover, unlike the leximin,
the maximin satises continuity and therefore egalitarian judgements based on the di¤erence
principle are more robust to small measurement mistakes, e.g. in empirical analysis. This
probably explains the wide use of the maximin in modern theories of equality of opportunity
(Roemer [50], [51]; Gotoh and Yoshihara [30]), in experimental approaches to distributive
justice (Konow [36]; Bolton and Ockenfels [14]), in the analysis of the ethics of exhaustible
resources and global warming (Solow [58]; Cairns and Long [18]; Roemer [53]; Llavador et al.
[39]), and in the context of intergenerational justice (Silvestre [57]; Llavador et al. [38]).4 In
the analysis of intergenerational justice and environmental economics, the maximin principle
is often taken to embody the very notion of sustainability (Llavador et al. [40]).
Indeed, and this is the third main contribution of the paper, we analyse liberal and liber-
tarian approaches to intergenerational justice. On the one hand, the intergenerational con-
text provides a natural framework for the application of liberal principles of non-interference.
For there certainly are many economic decisions whose e¤ects do not extend over time
4Maximin preferences are prominent also outside of normative economics - for example, in decision theory
and experimental economics. See, inter alia, the classic papers by Maskin ([48]); Barberà and Jackson ([11]);
Gilboa and Schmeidler ([29]); and, more recently, de Castro et al. ([23]); Sarin and Vahid ([55]).
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and leave the welfare of other generations unchanged. Moreover, liberal principles of non-
interference capture some widespread ethical intuitions in intergenerational justice (Wolf
[62]). In the seminal Brundtland report, for example, sustainable development is dened
precisely as development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their needs(Brundtland [17], p.43).
On the other hand, the application of liberal principles to intergenerational justice raises
complex theoretical and technical issues. Lombardi and Veneziani ([42]) and Alcantud ([2])
have shown that there exists no fair and Paretian swr that satises a fully non-interfering
view in societies with a countably innite number of agents. More generally, the analysis
of distributive justice among an innite number of generations is problematic for all of the
main approaches, and impossibility results often emerge (Lauwers [37]; Basu and Mitra [12];
Fleurbaey and Michel [26]; Zame [63]; Hara et al. [34]; Crespo et al. [20]). Several recent
contributions have provided characterisation results for swrs by dropping either complete-
ness (Basu and Mitra [13]; Asheim and Tungodden [5]; Bossert et al. [16]; Asheim et al. [8])
or transitivity (Sakai [54]).5 But the denition of suitable anonymous and Paretian swrs is
still an open question in the innite context (for a thorough discussion, see Asheim [3]).
Our main contribution to this literature is a novel analysis of liberal egalitarianism in
economies with a countably innite number of agents. To be specic, we provide a new
characterisation of one of the main extensions of the leximin swr in innitely-lived societies,
namely the leximin overtaking proposed by Asheim and Tungodden ([5]). As in the nite-
horizon case, we show that the Weak Harm Principle can be used to provide a simple and
intuitive characterisation, without appealing to any informational invariance or separability
property, or to axioms with an egalitarian content. Indeed, although we focus on a specic
extension of the leximin that is prominent in the literature on evaluating innite utility
streams, our arguments can be modied to obtain new characterisations for all of the main
approaches.
We also extend the analysis of Rawlss di¤erence principle to the intergenerational con-
text. As already noted, if the leximin is adopted, social judgements are sensitive to tiny
changes in welfare proles and measurement errors. In the intergenerational context, an
additional issue concerns the signicant incompleteness of leximin swrs which may hamper
social evaluation in a number of ethically relevant scenarios (see the discussion in Asheim
et al. [7]). Therefore we provide a novel characterisation of the maximin ordering (more
precisely, the inmum rule, Lauwers [37]) in societies with a countably innite number of
5Asheim and Zuber ([6]) have recently proposed a complete and transitive extension of the leximin
swr which overcomes the impossibility by requiring only sensitivity to the interests of generations whose
consumption has nite rank.
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agents: based on the Weak Harm Principle, we identify a complete egalitarian criterion that
allows for robust social evaluation of intergenerational distributive conicts.
Our result di¤ers from other characterisations in the literature in two key respects. Con-
ceptually, the characterisation is again obtained by focusing on standard e¢ ciency, fairness,
and continuity properties together with a liberal principle of non-interference: neither egal-
itarian axioms, nor informational invariance or separability properties are necessary. For-
mally, unlike in Lauwers([37]) seminal paper, the proof of the characterisation result in the
innite context echoes very closely that in nite societies: both the axiomatic framework and
the method of proof - and thus the underlying ethical intuitions - are essentially invariant.
In the light of our results, we can provide some tentative answers to the questions posed in
the opening paragraph. Liberal and libertarian approaches emphasising individual autonomy
and freedom are logically consistent and provide useful guidance in social judgements (in-
cluding in the analysis of intergenerational justice), provided the notion of non-interference
is suitably restricted. Perhaps counterintuitively, however, a liberal non-interfering approach
emphasising individual protection in circumstances of welfare losses leads straight to welfare
egalitarianism. Based on the Weak Harm Principle, it is possible to provide a unied ax-
iomatic framework to analyse a set of swrs originating from Rawlss di¤erence principle in
a welfaristic framework. Thus, our analysis sheds new light on the normative foundations
of standard egalitarian principles and provides a rigorous justication for the label liberal
egalitarianismusually associated with Rawlss approach.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic framework.
Section 3 introduces our main liberal axiom and characterises the leximin swo in economies
with a nite number of agents. Section 4 analyses the implications of liberal views for robust
(continuous) swos and derives a characterisation of the di¤erence principle. Sections 5 and
6 extend the analysis to the intergenerational context. Section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
Let X  [0; 1]N be the set of countably innite utility streams, where N is the set of natural
numbers. An element of X is 1u = (u1; u2; :::) and ut is the welfare level of agent t, or - in
the intergenerational context - of a representative member of generation t 2 N. For T 2 N,
1uT = (u1; :::; uT ) denotes the T -head of 1u and T+1u = (uT+1; uT+2; :::) denotes its T -tail,
so that 1u =
 
1uT , T+1u

. For x 2 [0; 1], conx = (x; x; x; :::) denotes the stream of constant
level of well-being equal to x.6
6The focus on the space of bounded vectors is standard in the literature (Lauwers [37]; Basu and Mitra
[12], [13]; Zame [63]; Hara et al. [34]; Asheim [3]; Asheim and Banerjee [4]). It is worth noting in passing
5
A permutation  is a bijective mapping of N onto itself. A permutation  of N is nite
if there is T 2 N such that (t) = t, for all t > T , and  is the set of all nite permutations
of N. For any 1u 2 X and any permutation , let  (1u) =
 
u(t)

t2N be a permutation of
1u. For any T 2 N and 1u 2 X, 1uT is a permutation of 1uT such that the components are
ranked in ascending order.
Let < be a (binary) relation over X. For any 1u, 1v 2 X, 1u < 1v stands for (1u; 1v) 2<
and 1u 6< 1v for (1u, 1v) =2<; < stands for at least as good as. The asymmetric factor 
of < is dened by 1u  1v if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v 6< 1u, and the symmetric part s
of < is dened by 1u s 1v if and only if 1u < 1v and 1v < 1u. They stand, respectively,
for strictly better thanand indi¤erent to. A relation < on X is said to be: reexive if,
for any 1u 2 X, 1u < 1u; and transitive if, for any 1u, 1v, 1w 2 X, 1u < 1v < 1w implies
1u < 1w. < is a quasi-ordering if it is reexive and transitive. Let < and <0 be relations on
X, we say that <0 is an extension of < if <<0 and 0.
In this paper, we study some desirable properties of quasi-orderings, which incorporate
notions of e¢ ciency, fairness and liberal views of non-interference. In this section, we present
some basic axioms that are used in the rest of the paper.
A property of swrs that is a priori desirable is that they be able to rank all possible
alternatives. Formally:7
Completeness, C: For all 1u, 1v 2 X, if 1u 6= 1v , then 1u < 1v or 1v < 1u.
The binary relation < is an ordering if it is a complete quasi-ordering.
The standard way of capturing e¢ ciency properties is by means of the Pareto axioms.8
Strong Pareto, SP: For all 1u; 1v 2 X, if 1u > 1v, then 1u  1v.
Weak Pareto,WP: For all 1u; 1v 2 X and all  > 0, if 1u  1v+ con , then 1u  1v.
Strong Pareto states that if all agents are at least as well o¤ in 1u as in 1v, and some of
them are strictly better o¤, then 1u should be socially strictly preferred to 1v. Weak Pareto
is weaker in that it requires all agents to be (discernibly) strictly better o¤ in 1u as in 1v.
A basic requirement of fairness is embodied in the following axiom, which states that
social judgements ought to be neutral with respect to agentsidentities.9
that, from a theoretical viewpoint, the T -dimensional unit box can be interpreted as the set of all conceivable
distributions of opportunities, where the latter are conceived of as chances in life, or probabilities of success
as in Mariotti and Veneziani ([44], [45]).
7Note that if 1u = 1v , then 1u < 1v is guaranteed by reexivity.
8The notation for vector inequalities is as follows: for any 1u, 1v 2 X, let 1u  1v if and only if ut  vt,
for all t 2 N; 1u > 1v if and only if 1u  1v and 1u 6= 1v; and 1u 1v if and only if ut > vt, for all t 2 N.
9Observe that the axiom focuses only on nite permutations. For this reason, it is often referred to as
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Anonymity, A: For all 1u 2 X, and all nite permutations  2 , (1u)  1u.
Finally, in the analysis of intergenerational justice, we follow the literature and consider
two mainly technical requirements to deal with innite-dimensional vectors (see, e.g., Asheim
and Tungodden [5]; Basu and Mitra [13]; Asheim [3]; Asheim and Banerjee [4]).
Preference Continuity, PC: For all 1u, 1v 2 X, if there is ~T  1 such that (1uT ,
T+1v) < 1v for all T  ~T , then 1u < 1v.
Weak Preference Continuity, WPC: For all 1u, 1v 2 X, if there is ~T  1 such that
(1uT , T+1v)  1v for all T  ~T , then 1u  1v.
These axioms establish a link to the standard nite setting of distributive justice, by
transforming the comparison of any two innite utility paths to an innite number of compar-
isons of utility paths each containing a nite number of generations(Asheim and Tungodden
[5]; p.223).
If there are only a nite set f1; :::; Tg = N  N of agents, or generations, XT is the
set of utility streams of X truncated at T = jN j, where jN j is the cardinality of N . In
order to simplify the notation, in economies with a nite number of agents the symbol u
is used instead of 1uT . With obvious adaptations, the notation and the axioms spelled out
above (except for Preference Continuity and Weak Preference Continuity) are carried over
utility streams in XT . In particular, observe that Weak Pareto and Anonymity are logically
equivalent to the standard weak Pareto and anonymity axioms in nite economies.
3 The Weak Harm Principle
We study the implications of liberal views of non-interference in fair and Paretian social
welfare judgements. In this section, we dene and discuss the main liberal principle and
then present a novel characterisation of the leximin ordering.
The key features of liberal views in social choice are captured by theWeak Harm Principle,
according to which agents have a right to prevent society from turning against them in all
situations in which they su¤er a welfare loss, provided no other agent is a¤ected. Formally:
Weak Harm Principle, WHP: For all u, v 2 XT , if u  v and if u0 and v0 in XT are
Weak or Finite Anonymity in order to distinguish it from Strong Anonymity, which also allows for innite
permutations. Because this distinction is not relevant for our analysis, we have opted for the simpler name
for the sake of notational parsimony.
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such that
u0i < ui, v
0
i < vi, for some i 2 N , and
u0j = uj , v
0
j = vj , for all j 6= i,
then v0  u0 if u0i > v0i.
In other words, consider two allocations u and v such that, for whatever reason, u is
strictly socially preferred to v. Then suppose that agent i su¤ers a welfare loss in both
allocations, while all other agentswelfare is unchanged, giving rise to two new allocations u0
and v0. The Weak Harm Principle says that, if agent i strictly prefers u0 to v0, then society
should not reverse the strict preference between u and v to a strict preference for v0 over u0.
The Weak Harm Principle captures a liberal view of non-interference whenever individual
choices have no e¤ect on others. The decrease in agent is welfare may be due to negligence
or bad luck, but in any case the principle states that society should not strictly prefer v0 over
u0: having already su¤ered a welfare loss in both allocations, an adverse switch in societys
strict preferences against agent i would represent an unjustied punishment for her.
The Weak Harm Principle assigns a veto power to individuals in situations in which
they su¤er a harm and no other agent is a¤ected. This veto power is weak in that it only
applies to certain welfare congurations (individual preferences after the welfare loss must
coincide with societys initial preferences) and, crucially, the individual cannot force societys
preferences to coincide with her own.
It is important to stress that the Principle incorporates some key liberal intuitions, and so
it may conict with di¤erent views on distributive justice. For there may be many nonliberal
reasons for society to switch from u  v to v0  u0. For example, it may be the case that
the sum (resp., the product) of individual utilities is higher at u than at v, but the opposite
is true when the primed alternatives are considered. Then, in a classical utilitarian (resp.,
Nash/prioritarian) approach, one would have u  v, but v0  u0.
In this case, the Weak Harm Principle may seem objectionable as it requires ignoring
all information concerning the size of the changes in welfare. The key point here is that
the axiom is not meant to capture utilitarian, Nash/prioritarian, or indeed any other dis-
tributive intuitions: it aims to incorporate some liberal views of autonomy and protection
from interference, for which issues of interpersonal comparability of welfare changes are at
best irrelevant. The axiom has an individualistic and non-aggregative structure (focusing on
changes in the situation of a single agent when everyone else is indi¤erent) precisely in order
to capture this important intuition of liberal and libertarian approaches.
The Weak Harm Principle is weaker than the Principle of Non-Interference formulated
by Mariotti and Veneziani ([46]) since it only focuses on welfare losses incurred by agents. It
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also represents a strict weakening of the Harm Principle proposed by Mariotti and Veneziani
([43]) because, unlike the latter, it does not require that societys preferences over u0 and
v0 be identical with agent is, but only that society should not reverse the strict preference
between u and v to a strict preference for v0 over u0 (possibly except when i prefers otherwise).
This weakening is important for both conceptual and formal reasons.
Conceptually, the Weak Harm Principle aims to capture - in a welfaristic framework -
a negative freedom that is central in classical liberal and libertarian approaches, namely,
freedom from interference from society, when no other individual is a¤ected. The name of
the axiom itself is meant to echo John Stuart Mills famous formulation in his essay On
Liberty.10 In this sense, by only requiring that agent i should not be punished in the swr by
changing social preferences against her, the liberal content of the axiom is much clearer and
the Weak Harm Principle strongly emphasises the negative prescription of Mills principle.
Formally, our weakening of the Harm Principle has relevant implications. Mariotti and
Veneziani ([43]; Theorem 1, p.126) prove that, jointly with Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and
Completeness, the Harm Principle characterises the leximin swo, according to which that
society is best which lexicographically maximises the welfare of its worst-o¤ members.
The leximin ordering <LM=LM [ sLM on XT is dened as follows. For all u; v 2 XT :
u  LMv , u1 > v1 or [there is i 2 Nnf1g : uj = vj (all j 2 N : j < i) and ui > vi];
u  LMv , ui = vi; all i 2 N .
The leximin swo is usually considered to have a strong egalitarian bias, and so a char-
acterisation based on a liberal principle with no explicit egalitarian content is surprising. To
clarify this point, note that the classic characterisation by Hammond ([31]) states that a swr
is the leximin ordering if and only if it satises Strong Pareto, Anonymity, Completeness,
and the following axiom.
Hammond Equity, HE: For all u; v 2 XT , if ui < vi < vj < uj for some i; j 2 N , and
uk = vk for all k 2 Nnfi; jg, then v < u.
Unlike the Harm Principle, Hammond Equity expresses a clear concern for equality, for
it asserts that among two welfare allocations which are not Pareto-ranked and di¤er only in
two components, society should prefer the more egalitarian one.
Hammond Equity and the Harm Principle are conceptually distinct and logically inde-
pendent. Yet, it has been argued that the characterisation of the leximin swo in Mariotti
and Veneziani ([43]) is formally unsurprising, because under Anonymity and Completeness,
10For a comprehensive philosophical discussion, see Mariotti and Veneziani ([47]).
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the Harm Principle implies Hammond Equity (see Alcantud [2], Proposition 4).11 This ob-
jection does not hold if one considers the Weak Harm Principle. To see this, consider the
following example.
Example 1 (Su¢ cientarianism) Suppose that welfare units can be normalised so that a
welfare level equal to 1=2 represents a decent living standard. Then one can dene a swr
<s on XT according to which that society is best in which the highest number of people reach
a decent living standard. Formally, for all u 2 XT let P (u) = fi 2 N : ui  1=2g and let
jP (u)j denote the cardinality of P (u). Then, for all u; v 2 XT :
u <s v , jP (u)j  jP (v)j :
It is immediate to see that <s on XT is an ordering and it satises Anonymity and the
Weak Harm Principle, but violates both Hammond Equity and the Harm Principle.12
Observe that the absence of any conceptual and formal relations between the Weak Harm
Principle and Hammond Equity, even under Anonymity, established in Example 1 is not a
mere technical artefact. The Suppes-Sen grading principle, for instance, satises Anonymity
and the Weak Harm Principle and violates Hammond Equity, but one may object that this
is due to its incompleteness. In contrast, the swr in Example 1 is complete and it embodies
a prominent approach to distributive justice in political philosophy and social choice (see, for
example, Frankfurt [28] and Roemer [52]). Thus, even under Anonymity and Completeness,
liberal principles of non-interference incorporate substantially di¤erent normative intuitions
than standard equity axioms. Example 1 also highlights the theoretical relevance of our
weakening of the Harm Principle, for the Weak Harm Principle is consistent with a wider
class of swos, including some - such as the su¢ cientarian - which embody widely shared
views on distributive justice.
Given this, it is remarkable that the characterisation result provided in Mariotti and
Veneziani ([43]) can be strengthened.13
Proposition 2 : A swr < onXT is the leximin ordering if and only if it satisesAnonymity,
Strong Pareto, Completeness andWeak Harm Principle.
11The argument is originally due to François Maniquet in unpublished correspondence.
12Consider, for example, two welfare proles u; v 2 XT such that u = (1; 0; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1) and v =
( 13 ;
1
4 ; 1; 1; 1; :::; 1). By denition u s v, which violates Hammond Equity.
13The properties in Proposition 2 are clearly independent. The proof of Proposition 2 is a generalisation
of the proof of Theorem 1 in Mariotti and Veneziani ([43]) and is available from the authors upon request
(see the Addendum).
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In the light of our discussion of the Weak Harm Principle and Example 1, it is worth
stressing some key theoretical implications of Proposition 2. First, it is possible to eschew
impossibility results by weakening the Principle of Non-Interference proposed by Mariotti
and Veneziani ([47]) while capturing some core liberal intuitions. For by Proposition 2 there
exist anonymous and strongly Paretian swos consistent with liberal non-interfering views,
as expressed in the Weak Harm Principle.
Second, by Proposition 2 Hammond Equity and the Weak Harm Principle are equivalent
in the presence of Anonymity, Completeness, and Strong Pareto, even though they are
logically independent. However, it can be proved that if N = f1; 2g, then under Strong
Pareto and Completeness, Hammond Equity implies the Weak Harm Principle, but the
converse is never true (see Mariotti and Veneziani [47]). Together with Example 1, this
implies that Proposition 2 is far from trivial. For even under Completeness and either
Anonymity or Strong Pareto, the Weak Harm Principle is not stronger than Hammond
Equity, and it is actually strictly weaker, at least in some cases.
Third, Proposition 2 puts the normative foundations of leximin under a rather di¤erent
light. For, unlike in standard results, the egalitarian swo is characterised without appealing
to any axioms with a clear egalitarian content.14 Actually, Strong Pareto, Completeness, and
the Weak Harm Principle are compatible with some of the least egalitarian swos, namely
the lexicographic dictatorships, which proves that the Weak Harm Principle imposes no
signicant egalitarian restriction. As a result, Proposition 2 highlights the normative strength
of Anonymity in determining the egalitarian outcome, an important insight which is not
obvious in standard characterisations based on Hammond Equity.
The next sections signicantly extend and generalise these intuitions.
4 Liberal egalitarianism reconsidered
One common objection to the leximin swo is its sensitivity to small changes in welfare
proles, and so to measurement errors and minor variations in policies. Albeit possibly
secondary in theoretical analyses, these issues are relevant in empirical applications and
policy debates. As Chichilnisky ([19], p.346) aptly noted, "Continuity is a natural assumption
that is made throughout the body of economic theory, and it is certainly desirable as it
permits approximation of social preferences on the basis of a sample of individual preferences,
and makes mistakes in identifying preferences less crucial. These are relevant considerations
in a world of imperfect information." In this section, we study the implications of liberal
non-interfering approaches for social evaluations that are robust to small changes in welfare
14Nor to any invariance or separability axioms.
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proles.
A standard way of capturing this property is by an interprole condition requiring the
swo to vary continuously with changes in utility streams.
Continuity, CON: For all u 2 XT , the sets fv 2 XT jv < ug and fv 2 XT ju < vg are
closed.
By Proposition 2, if Continuity is imposed in addition to the Weak Harm Principle,
Completeness, Strong Pareto and Anonymity an impossibility result immediately obtains.
Therefore we weaken our e¢ ciency requirement to focus on Weak Pareto and show that the
combination of the ve axioms characterises Rawlss di¤erence principle, according to which
that society is best which maximises the welfare of the worst o¤ individual.
The maximin ordering <M on XT is dened as follows: for all u; v 2 XT ;
u <M v , u1  v1.
Theorem 3 states that the standard requirements of fairness, e¢ ciency, completeness,
and continuity, together with our liberal axiom characterise the maximin swo.15
Theorem 3 : A swr < onXT is the maximin ordering if and only if it satisesAnonymity,
Weak Pareto, Completeness, Continuity andWeak Harm Principle.
Proof. ()) Let < on XT be the maximin ordering, i.e., <=<M . It can be easily veried
that <M on XT satises A,WP, C, CON, andWHP.
(() Let < on XT be a swr satisfying A, WP, C, CON and WHP. We show that < is
the maximin swo. We prove that, for all u, v 2 XT ,
u M v , u  v (1)
and
u M v , u  v. (2)
Note that as < on XT satises A, in what follows we can focus either on u and v, or on the
ranked vectors u and v, without loss of generality.
First, we show that the implication ()) of (1) is satised. Take any u; v 2 XT . Suppose
that u M v , u1 > v1. We proceed by contradiction, rst proving that v  u is impossible
and then ruling out v  u.
15The properties in Theorem 3 are clearly independent.
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Suppose that v  u, or equivalently, v  u. AsWP holds, vj  uj for some j 2 N , otherwise
a contradiction immediately obtains. We proceed according to the following steps.
Step 1. Let
k = inf fl 2 N jvl  ulg .
By A, let vi = vk and let ui = u1. Then, consider two real numbers d1, d2 > 0, and two
vectors u, v0 - together with the corresponding ranked vectors u, v0 - formed from u, v as
follows: u1 is lowered to u1   d1 > v1; vk is lowered to uk > vk   d2 > u1   d1; and all other
entries of u and v are unchanged. By construction u, v0 2 XT and uj > v0j for all j  k,
whereas byWHP, C, and A, we have v0 < u.
Step 2. Let
0 <  < inffuj   v0jjj  kg
and dene u0 = u   con. By construction, u0 2 XT and u  u0. WP implies u  u0. As
v0 < u, by step 1, the transitivity of < implies v0  u0.
If u0j > v
0
j for all j 2 N , WP implies u0  v0, a contradiction. Otherwise, let v0l  u0l for
some l > k. Then, let
k0 = inf fl 2 N jv0l  u0lg :
The above steps 1-2 can be applied to u0, v0 to derive vectors u00, v00 2 XT such that u00j > v00j
for all j  k0, whereas v00  u00. ByWP, a contradiction is obtained whenever u00j > v00j for
all j 2 N . Otherwise, let v00l  u00l for some l > k0. And so on. After a nite number s
of iterations, two vectors us, vs 2 XT can be derived such that vs  us, by steps 1-2, but
us  vs, byWP, a contradiction.
Therefore, by C, it must be u < v whenever u M v. We have to rule out the possibility
that u  v. We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that u  v. Since v1 < u1, there exists
 > 0 such that u = u  con, u 2 XT , and v1 < u1 so that u M v. However, byWP and
transitivity of < it follows that v  u. Apply the above reasoning to v and u to obtain the
desired contradiction.
Now, we show that the implication ()) of (2) is met as well. Suppose u1 = v1. If u1 = 1,
the result follows by reexivity. Hence suppose u1 < 1. Let T(u)= ft 2 N : ut = u1g and let
uK be such that uKt = ut, all t =2 T(u), and uKt = ut + K 1, all t 2 T(u), where K is any
natural number such that ut+K 1 < 1, all t 2 T(u). By construction, uk 2 XT and uk1 > v1
for all k  K. Since limk!1 uk = u and uk 2 fx 2 XT jx < vg for all k  K, CON implies
u < v. A symmetric argument proves that v < u, and so u  v.
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Theorem 3 has two main implications in the context of our analysis. First, it shows
that there exist anonymous and (weakly) Paretian liberal swos that are also continuous.
This is particularly interesting given that the consistency between Weak Pareto, continuity
properties, and liberal principles in the spirit of Sens celebrated Minimal Liberalism axiom
has been recently called into question by Kaplow and Shavell ([35]).
Second, Theorem 3 provides a novel characterisation of the di¤erence principle that gen-
eralises the key insight of section 3. Standard characterisations focus either on informational
invariance and separability properties (dAspremont and Gevers [22]; Segal and Sobel [56]),
or on axioms incorporating a clear inequality aversion such as Hammond Equity (Bosmans
and Ooghe [15]) or the Pigou-Dalton principle (Fleurbaey and Tungodden [27]). Theorem 3
characterises an egalitarian swo by using an axiom - the Weak Harm Principle - that, unlike
informational invariance properties has a clear ethical foundation, but it has no egalitarian
content as it only incorporates a liberal, non-interfering view of society.
5 A liberal principle of intergenerational justice
In the previous sections, we have studied the implications of liberal principles of non-
interference in societies with a nite number of agents. We now extend our analysis to
societies with a countably innite number of agents. A liberal non-interfering approach
seems particularly appropriate in the analysis of intergenerational distributive issues: al-
though the welfare of a generation is often a¤ected by decisions taken by their predecessors,
there certainly are many economic decisions whose e¤ects do not extend over time and leave
the welfare of other generations unchanged. In this section (and the next), we explore the
implications of fair and Paretian liberal approaches to intergenerational justice.
The extension of the main liberal principle to the analysis of intergenerational justice is
rather straightforward and needs no further comment, except possibly noting that in this
context, the Weak Harm Principle is weakened to hold only for pairs of welfare allocations
whose tails can be Pareto-ranked.
Weak Harm Principle, WHP: For all 1u, 1v 2 X with 1v  (1vT ; (T+1u+ con)) for
some T  1 and some   0, if 1u  1v and if 1u0 and 1v0 in X are such that
u0i < ui; v
0
i < vi; for some i  T , and
u0j = uj ; v
0
j = vj ; for all j 6= i,
then 1v0  1u0 if u0i > v0i.
As already noted, economies with an innite number of agents raise several formal and
conceptual issues, and di¤erent denitions of the main criteria (including utilitarianism,
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egalitarianism, the Nash ordering, and so on) can be provided in order to compare (count-
ably) innite utility streams. Here, we derive a novel characterisation of one of the main
approaches in the literature, namely the leximin overtaking recently formalised by Asheim
and Tungodden ([5]), in the tradition of Atsumi ([10]) and von Weizsäcker ([61]). Yet, as
argued at the end of the section, our key results are robust and the Weak Harm Principle
can be used to provide normative foundations to all of the main extensions of the leximin
swr.
The leximin overtaking criterion is dened as follows.
Definition 1. (Asheim and Tungodden [5]; Denition 2, p.224) For all 1u, 1v 2 X,
(i) 1u LM 1v , there is ~T  1 such that 1uT = 1vT , for all T  ~T ;
(ii) 1u LM 1v , there is ~T  1 such that, for all T  ~T , there exists t 2 f1; :::; Tg:
us = vs , for all 1  s < t, and ut > vt.
According to Denition 1, an innite utility stream 1u is strictly preferred to another
stream 1v if and only if there is a nite period ~T such that, for every period T after ~T , the
welfare levels of the rst T generations in 1u strictly leximin dominate those of the rst T
generations in 1v. Similarly, 1u is indi¤erent to 1v if and only if there is a period ~T such
that, for every period T after ~T , the T -head of 1u is leximin indi¤erent to the T -head of 1v.
In order to characterise the leximin overtaking, we need to weaken completeness and
require that the swr be (at least) able to compare proles with the same tail.
Minimal Completeness, MC: For all 1u, 1v 2 X with 1u =
 
1uT , T+1v

for some T  1,
if 1u 6= 1v , then 1u < 1v or 1v < 1u.
Theorem 4 proves that Anonymity, Strong Pareto, the Weak Harm Principle, Minimal
Completeness and Weak Preference Continuity characterise the leximin overtaking.16
Theorem 4 : < is an extension of <LMif and only if < satises Anonymity, Strong
Pareto, Minimal Completeness, Weak Harm Principle and Weak Preference
Continuity.
Proof ()) Let <LM<. It is easy to see that < meets A and SP. By observing that <LM
is complete for comparisons between utility streams with the same tail it is also easy to see
that < satisesMC andWPC.
We show that < meets WHP. Let 1u, 1v 2 X be such that 1u  1v, and there exist
T  1 and   0 such that 1v  (1vT ; (T+1u+ con)), and 1u0, 1v0 2 X are such that u0i < ui,
16The properties in Theorem 4 are independent (see the Addendum).
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v0i < vi, some i  T , and u0j = uj , v0j = vj , all j 6= i. We show that 1u0  1v0 whenever
u0i > v
0
i.
Because <LM is complete for comparisons between utility streams whose tails di¤er by
a nonnegative constant, 1u LM 1v. Then take any T 0  ~T that corresponds to part (ii)
of Denition 1. Theorem 1 in Mariotti and Veneziani ([43]; 126) implies that there exists
t  t  T 0 such that u0s = v0s , for all 1  s < t and v0t < u0t. Since the choice of T 0
corresponding to part (ii) of Denition 1 was arbitrary, it follows that 1u0  1v0.
(() Suppose that < satises A, SP,MC,WHP andWPC. We show that LM and
LM. Take any 1u, 1v 2 X.
Since LM follows from Asheim and Tungodden ([5]), we only show that LM.
Suppose 1u LM 1v. Take any T  ~T that corresponds to part (ii) of Denition 1 and
consider 1w  (1uT , T+1v) 2 X. Note that 1w LM 1v. We show that 1w  1v. By A and
transitivity, we can consider 1 w  (1uT , T+1v) and 1v  (1vT , T+1v) . ByMC, suppose that
1v < 1 w. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. 1v  1 w
As SP holds it must be the case that vl > wl for some l > t. Let
k = infft < l  T jvl > wlg.
By A, let vi = vk and let wi = wk g, for some 1  g < k, where wk g > vk g. Then, let
two real numbers d1, d2 > 0, and consider vectors 1w0, 1v0 formed from 1 w, 1v as follows:
wk g is lowered to wk g   d1 such that wk g   d1 > vk g; vk is lowered to vk   d2 such that
wk > vk   d2 > wk g   d1; and all other entries of 1 w and 1v are unchanged. By A, consider
1 w
0 = (1 w0T , T+1v) and 1v
0 = (1v0T , T+1v). By construction 1 w
0;1 v0 2 X and w0j  v0j for all
j  k, with w0k g > v0k g; whereas WHP, combined with MC and A, implies 1v0 < 1 w0.
Furthermore, by SP, it is possible to choose d1, d2 > 0, such that 1v0  1 w0, without loss of
generality. Consider two cases:
a) Suppose that vk > wk, but wl  vl for all l > k. It follows that 1 w0 > 1v0, and so SP
implies that 1 w0  1v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that vl > wl for some l > k. Note that by construction v0l = vl and w
0
l = wl for
all l > k. Then, let
k0 = inffk < l  T jv0l > w0lg.
The above argument can be applied to 1 w0, 1v0 to derive vectors 1 w00, 1v00 2 X such that
w00j  v00j for all j  k0, whereasWHP, combined withMC, A, and SP, implies 1v00  1 w00.
And so on. After a nite number of iterations s, two vectors 1 ws, 1vs 2 X can be derived
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such that, by WHP, combined with MC, A, and SP, we have that 1vs  1 ws, but SP
implies 1 ws  1vs, yielding a contradiction.
Case 2. 1v  1 w
Since, by our supposition, vt < ut  wt, there exists  > 0 such that vt < wt    < wt.
Let 1 w 2 X be a vector such that wt = wt    and wj = wj for all j 6= t. It follows that
1 w
 LM 1v but 1v  1 w by SP and the transitivity of <. Hence, the argument of Case 1
above can be applied to 1v and 1 w, yielding the desired contradiction.
It follows from MC that 1 w  1v. Then A, combined with the transitivity of <, implies
that (1uT ; T+1v)  1v. Since T  ~T is arbitrary,WPC implies 1u  1v, as desired.
Theorem 4 shows that, if the Principle of Non-Interference analysed by Lombardi and
Veneziani ([42]) and Alcantud ([2]) is suitably restricted to hold only for welfare losses,
then intergenerational distributive conicts can be adjudicated by means of liberal, fair and
Paretian social criteria. Indeed, Theorem 4 provides a novel characterisation of one of the
main extensions of the leximin to economies with an innite number of agents, based on the
Weak Harm Principle, thus conrming the link between a liberal and libertarian concern
for individual autonomy, and egalitarian criteria, in the intergenerational context also.17
These conclusions are robust and can be extended to alternative denitions of the lex-
imin.18 For example, if Weak Preference Continuity is replaced with a stronger continuity
requirement, a stronger version of the leximin overtaking (the S-Leximin, see Asheim and
Tungodden, [5]; Denition 1, p.224) can easily be derived. Perhaps more interestingly,
Bossert et al. ([16]) have dropped continuity properties and have characterised a larger class
of extensions of the leximin criterion satisfying Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and an innite
version of Hammond Equity.19 Lombardi and Veneziani ([41]) have shown that it is possible
to provide a characterisation of the leximin relation dened by Bossert et al. ([16]) based on
Strong Pareto, Anonymity, and the Weak Harm Principle. Further, the Weak Harm Princi-
ple can be used - instead of various versions of the Hammond equity axiom - to characterise
the leximin swr proposed by Sakai ([54]), which drops transitivity but retains completeness;
and the time-invariant leximin overtaking proposed by Asheim et al. ([7]).20
17It is worth noting in passing that Theorem 4 can be further strengthened by requiring WHP to hold
only for vectors with the same tail, namely  = 0.
18The proofs of the following claims are available from the authors upon request.
19Formally, the relationship between the characterisation of the leximin by Bossert et al. ([16]) and that by
Asheim and Tungodden ([5]) is analogous to the relationship between the characterisation of the utilitarian
swr by Basu and Mitra ([13]) and the characterisations of the more restrictive utilitarian swr induced by
the overtaking criterion (see the discussion in Bossert et al. [16]; p.580).
20As compared to the standard overtaking criterion, the time invariant version does not rely on a natural
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6 The intergenerational di¤erence principle
In section 4, we argued that a potential shortcoming of the leximin criterion is its sensitivity
to innitesimal changes in welfare proles and explored the implications of liberal principles
together with a continuity requirement that incorporates a concern for robustness in social
judgements. In the context of intergenerational distributive justice, a further problem of the
various extensions of the leximin criterion is their incompleteness, which makes them unable
to produce social judgements in a large class of pairwise comparisons of welfare proles.
In this section, we complete our study of liberal principles of non-interference by analysing
the implications of theWeak Harm Principle for intergenerational justice when social welfare
criteria are required to be continuous and to be able to adjudicate all distributive conicts.
This is by no means a trivial question, for it is well known that continuity is a problematic
requirement for swos in economies with an innite number of agents and impossibility results
often emerge.21
The main axioms incorporating completeness, fairness, e¢ ciency, and liberal non-interference
are the same as in previous sections. Further, we follow the standard practice in the literature
(see, e.g., Lauwers [37]) and dene continuity based on the sup metric.
Sup Continuity, CONd1: For all 1u 2 X, if there is a sequence of vectors

1v
k
	1
k=1
such
that limk!1 1vk = 1v 2 X with respect to the sup metric d1, and 1vk < 1u (resp., 1u <
1v
k) for all k 2 N, then 1u 6 1v (resp., 1v 6 1u).
Observe that in general CONd1 is weaker than the standard continuity axiom but it is
equivalent to the latter if the swr is complete as in Theorem 5 below.22
Our next result extends the key insights on liberal egalitarianism to the intergenerational
context. Formally, themaximin swo <M onX can be dened as follows. For all 1u; 1v 2 X,
1u <M

1v , inf
t2N
ut  inf
t2N
vt:
Theorem 5 proves that Anonymity, Weak Pareto, Completeness, Sup Continuity, Weak
Harm Principle, and Preference Continuity characterise <M on X.23
ordering of generations. Thus, it is possible to drop Weak Preference Continuity and replace it with a similar
consistency axiom that does not entail a preference for earlier generations.
21See the classic paper by Diamond ([24]). For more recent contributions see Hara et al. ([34]) and the
literature cited therein.
22It is also weaker than the Continuity axiom recently proposed by Asheim et al. ([9], p.271), although
the two properties are equivalent for complete swrs.
23The properties in Theorem 5 are independent (see the Addendum). It is worth noting in passing that
the characterisation of the maximin swo can also be obtained without the full force of completeness, by
adopting an axiom similar to MC above. We thank Geir Asheim for this suggestion.
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Theorem 5 A swr < on X is the maximin swo if and only if it satises Anonymity,
Weak Pareto, Completeness, Sup Continuity,Weak Harm Principle and Prefer-
ence Continuity.
Proof. ()) Let < on X be the maximin swo, i.e., <=<M. It can be easily veried that
<M on X satises A,WP, C, CONd1,WHP and PC.
(() Let < on X be a swr satisfying A,WP, C, CONd1,WHP and PC. We show that
< is the maximin swo. To this end, it su¢ ces to show that for all 1u, 1v 2 X,
inf
t2N
ut > inf
t2N
vt ) 1u  1v (3)
and
inf
t2N
ut = inf
t2N
vt ) 1u  1v. (4)
Consider (3). Take any 1u, 1v 2 X such that inft2N ut > inft2N vt. In order to prove that
1u  1v, we rst demonstrate that conx^ < 1v holds, where
x^ =
inft2N ut + inft2N vt
2
:
To this end, we distinguish two cases.
Case 1. supt2N vt < 1.
As a rst step, we shall prove that
9T  1,8t  T : (1x^t; t+1v + con) < 1v, 8 > 0 : (1x^t; t+1v + con) 2 X: (5)
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that (5) fails. Since < satises C, it follows
that for any T  1 there exist t  T and  > 0 such that (1x^t; t+1v + con) 2 X, and 1v 
(1x^t; t+1v + con). Since x^ > inft2N vt, it follows that there exists T   1 such that x^ > vT  
inffv1; :::; vT g. By the contradicting hypothesis, and since < satises C, there exist t  T 
and  > 0 such that (1x^t ; t+1v + con) 2 X and 1v  (1x^t ; t+1v + con). For the sake
of notational simplicity, let (1x^t ; t+1v + con)  1x. Observe that x^ > inffv1; :::; vT g 
inffv1; :::; vtg.
Let 1v  (1vt ;t+1 v). By A and transitivity, 1v  1x. Suppose that 1xt  1vt. Then,
there exists 0 < a < inf

inffxt   vtjt  tg; 2
	
such that xt  vt+ a for all t 2 N. But then
WP implies 1x  1v yielding a contradiction.
Therefore, suppose that for some 1 < t  t we have that vt  xt = x^. We proceed
according to the following steps.
Step 1. Let
q = inf f1 < t  tjvt  xt = x^g .
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Then, consider two real numbers d1, d2 > 0, and two vectors 1x1, 1v0 - together with the
corresponding ranked vectors 1x1 = (1x1t ;t+1 x), 1v
0 = (1v0t ;t+1 v) - formed from 1x, 1v as
follows: xq is lowered to x1q = xq   d1 = x^   d1 > v1 = inffv1; :::; vtg; vq is lowered to
v0q = vq   d2 where x^ > vq   d2 > x^   d1; and all other entries of 1x and 1v are unchanged.
By construction, 1x1, 1v0 2 X and x1t > v0t for all 1  t  q, whereas byWHP, C, A, we
have 1v0 < 1x1.
Step 2. Let
0 < k < inf
n
inffx1t   v0tjt  qg; inff1  v0tjq < t  tg;

2t
o
<  (6)
and dene 1v1 = 1v0 + conk. By construction, 1v1 2 X and v1t  v0t + k for all t 2 N, and so
WP implies 1v1  1v0. Since 1v0 < 1x1, then transitivity implies that 1v1  1x1.
Suppose that 1x1t  1v1t. Then, since inft2N x1t > inft2N v1t and t+1x1  t+1v+ con 
t+1v
1  t+1v+ conk, there exists a 2
 
0; inf

inffx1t   v0tjt  tg; k2t
	
such that x1t  v1t +a
for all t 2 N. WP implies 1x1  1v1 yielding a contradiction. Otherwise, let v1t  x1t for
some t, with q < t  t. Let
q0 = inf

q < t  tj v1t  x1t
	
.
Noting that by (6),    k = 0 > 0 so that t+1x1  t+1v1 = con0  con0, the above steps
1-2 can be applied to 1x1, 1v1 to derive vectors 1x2, 1v2 2 X such that x2t > v2t for all
1  t  q0, whereas 1v2  1x2. By WP, a contradiction can be obtained whenever 1x2t 
1v
2
t. Otherwise, let x
2
t  v2t for some q0 < t  t. And so on. After a nite number s  t
of iterations, two vectors 1xs;1 vs 2 X can be derived such that 1vs  1xs, by steps 1-2,
but 1xst  1vst, and so 1xs  1vs can be obtained by applyingWP, a contradiction. This
completes the proof of (5).
Next, we prove that conx^ < 1v holds. To this end, dene H 2 N such that 1v+conh 1 2 X
for all h 2 N, h  H: the existence of H is guaranteed by the assumption supt2N vt < 1.
Because (5) holds, it follows that there exists T  1 such that (1x^t; t+1v + conh 1) 2 X and
(1x^t; t+1v + conh
 1) < 1v for all t  T and all h  H. Fix any t  T . Then, since limh!1
(1x^t; t+1v + conh
 1) = (1x^t; t+1v) 2 X and (1x^t; t+1v + conh 1) < 1v for any h  H,
CONd1 and C imply that (1x^t; t+1v) < 1v. Because t  T is arbitrary, it follows that
(1x^t; t+1v) < 1v for all t  T , and so PC implies that conx^ < 1v, as sought.
Case 2. supt2N vt = 1.
As inft2N ut > inft2N vt, choose K 2 N large enough such that the set T (K) dened below
is non-empty:
T (K) 

t 2 Nj1  1
K
< vt  1; vt0 < vt   1
K
for some t0 2 N

.
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Consider 1vK formed from 1v as follows: vKt = vt   1K , for all t 2 T (K), and vKt = vt for
all t =2 T (K). By construction, 1vK 2 X, supt vKt  1   1K and inft ut > inft vKt = inft vt.
By (5), C and CONd1, it follows that for some T  1, (1x^t; t+1vK) < 1vK for all t  T .
Since the above arguments hold for any k  K, then (1x^t; t+1vk) < 1vk for all t  T and
all k  K. Further, limk!1
 
1v
k

= 1v and limk!1(1x^t;t+1vk) = (1x^t;t+1v), and so C and
CONd1 imply that (1x^t; t+1v) < 1v for all t  T . The desired result then follows from PC
as in Case 1.
We have established that conx^ < 1v. In order to complete the proof of (3), we note that
by construction, 1u  conx^ and inft2N ut > x^, and so WP implies that 1u  conx^ . By
transitivity we conclude that 1u  1v, as sought.
Next, we show that (4) holds as well. Suppose that inft2N ut = inft2N vt. If inft2N ut = 1, then
the result follows by reexivity. Hence suppose inft2N ut < 1. Choose  > 0 small enough
such that the set T (1u; ) dened below is non-empty:
T (1u; )  ft0 2 Nj1 > inf
t
ut +  > ut0  inf
t
utg:
Fix  > 0 such that   , and consider 1u formed from 1u as follows: ut = ut + , all
t 2 T (1u; ), and u0t = ut, all t =2 T (1u; ). By construction, 1u 2 X and inft ut > inft vt,
and so 1u  1v by (3). Since it holds for any  > 0 such that    and since lim!0
1u
 = 1u, C and CONd1 imply 1u < 1v. A similar argument proves 1v < 1u, and thus we
obtain 1u  1v.
Theorem 5 establishes an interesting possibility result for liberal approaches in economies
with an innite number of agents. For it proves that there exist fair, Paretian and continuous
social welfare orderings that respect a liberal principle of non-interference. Indeed, the
maximin swo satises even the stronger version of the Weak Harm Principle (analogous to
that presented in section 3) extended to hold for any countably innite streams.
Further, Theorem 5 provides a novel, and interesting characterisation of the maximin swo
in the intergenerational context. Lauwers ([37]) characterises the maximin swo in the innite
context by focusing on Weak Pareto, Anonymity,24 Continuity, Repetition Approximation
and either a strong version of Hammond Equity,25 or Ordinal Level Comparability. Theorem
5 provides a completely di¤erent liberal foundation to the maximin swo, because the Weak
Harm Principle is logically and theoretically distinct both from axioms with an egalitarian
content, such as Hammond Equity, and from informational invariance conditions.
24Actually, the characterisation by Lauwers ([37]) relies on a Strong Anonymity axiom that considers all
permutations of the utility vectors.
25Formally, for any two bounded innite vectors 1u, 1v such that ui  vi  vj  uj for some i; j 2 N and
uk = vk for all k 2 Nnfi; jg, 1v < 1u (Lauwers [37], p.46).
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7 Conclusions
A number of recent contributions have raised serious doubts on the possibility of a fair
and e¢ cient liberal approach to distributive justice that incorporates a fully non-interfering
view. This paper has shown that possibility results do emerge, in societies with both a
nite and an innite number of agents, provided the bite of non-interference is limited in an
ethically relevant way. Anonymous and Paretian criteria exist which incorporate a notion of
protection of individuals (or generations) from unjustied interference, in situations in which
they su¤er a welfare loss, provided no other agent (or generation) is a¤ected.
A weaker version of a liberal axiom - the Harm Principle - recently proposed by Mar-
iotti and Veneziani ([43]), together with standard properties, allows us to derive a set of
new characterisations of the maximin and of its lexicographic renement, including in the
intergenerational context. This is surprising, because the Weak Harm Principle is meant
to capture a liberal and libertarian requirement of non-interference and it incorporates no
obvious egalitarian content. Thus, our results shed new light on the ethical foundations
of the egalitarian approaches stemming from Rawlss di¤erence principle, and provide new
meaning to the label of liberal egalitarianism usually attached to Rawlss theory.
From the viewpoint of liberal approaches emphasising a notion of individual autonomy, or
freedom, however, our results have a rather counterintuitive implication. For they prove that,
in various contexts, liberal non-interfering principles lead straight to welfare egalitarianism.
8 Addendum (not for publication)
8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
()) Let < on XT be the leximin ordering, i.e., <=<LM . It is clear that leximin ordering
satisesC, SP andA. Moreover, sinceWHP is weaker thanHP, the proof that <LM onXT
meetsWHP follows from the proof of necessity of HP provided by Mariotti and Veneziani
([43], Theorem 1, p.126).
(() Let < on XT be a swo satisfying SP, A, C, andWHP. We show that < on XT is the
leximin swo. Thus, we should prove that, for all u, v 2 XT ,
u LM v , u  v (7)
and
u LM v , u  v (8)
First, we prove the implication ()) of (7). If u LM v, then u = v, and so u  v, by A.
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Next, we prove the implication ()) of (8). Suppose that u LM v, and so, by denition
u1 > v1 or there is t 2 f2; :::; Tg such that us = vs for all 1  s < t and ut > vt. Suppose,
by contradiction, that v  u. Note that since < satises A, in what follows we can focus,
without loss of generality, either on u and v, or on the ranked vectors u and v. Therefore,
suppose v  u. As SP holds it must be the case that vl > ul for some l > t. Let
k = minft < l  T jvl > ulg.
By A, let vi = vk and let ui = uk g, for some 1  g < k, where uk g > vk g. Then, let two
real numbers d1, d2 > 0, and consider vectors u0, v0 and the corresponding ranked vectors u0,
v0 formed from u, v as follows: rst, uk g is lowered to uk g  d1 such that uk g  d1 > vk g;
next, vk is lowered to vk   d2 such that uk > vk   d2 > uk g   d1; nally, all other entries
of u and v are unchanged. By construction u0, v0 2 XT and u0j  v0j for all j  k, with
u0k g > v
0
k g, whereasWHP, combined with C, and A, implies v
0 < u0. By SP, d1, d2 > 0
can be chosen so that v0  u0, without loss of generality. Consider two cases:
a) Suppose that vk > uk, but ul  vl for all l > k. It follows that u0 > v0, and so SP implies
that u0  v0, a contradiction.
b) Suppose that vl > ul for some l > k. Note that by construction v0l = vl and u
0
l = ul for all
l > k. Then, let
k0 = minfk < l  T jv0l > u0lg.
The above argument can be applied to u0, v0 to derive vectors u00, v00 such that u00, v00 2 XT
and u00j  v00j for all j  k0, whereasWHP, combined with A, C, and SP, implies v00  u00.
And so on. After a nite number of iterations s, two vectors us, vs 2 XT can be derived
such that, by WHP, combined with A, C, and SP, we have that vs  us, but us > vs so
that SP implies us  vs, yielding a contradiction.
We have proved that if u LM v then u < v: Suppose now, by contradiction, that v  u,
or equivalently v  u. Since, by our supposition, vt < ut, there exists  > 0 such that
vt < ut    < ut. Let u 2 XT be a vector such that ut = ut    and uj = uj for all j 6= t.
It follows that u LM v but v  u by SP and the transitivity of <. Hence, the above
argument can be applied to v and u, yielding the desired contradiction.
8.2 Independence of Axioms
The proofs of the independence of the axioms used to characterise the nite maximin and
leximin swos are obvious and therefore they are omitted. It is worth noting, however, that
some of the examples below can be easily adapted to apply to the nite context.
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8.2.1 Independence of axioms used in Theorem 4
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 4, we show that the axioms are tight.
For an example violating only A, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u; 1v 2 X,
1u  1v , 1u = 1v ;
1u  1v , either u1 > v1, or there is T 2 Nn f1g : ut = vt, for all t < T , and uT > vT .
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM. The swr < on X satises
all axioms except A.
For an example violating only SP, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u; 1v 2 X, 1u  1v.
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM. The swr < on X satises
all axioms except SP.
For an example violating only WHP, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u;1 v 2 X,
1u  1v , there is ~T  1 such that for all T  ~T : 1uT = 1vT ;
1u  1v , there is ~T  1 such that for all T  ~T ; there is t 2 f1; :::; Tg with us = vs (all t < s  T ) and ut > vt:
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM. The swr < on X satises
all axioms exceptWHP.
For an example violating only MC, let for any T 2 N and 1u 2 X, T (1uT ) be a
permutation of 1uT . Then dene < on X as follows: for all 1u,1v 2 X,
1u  1v , there is ~T  1 such that for all T  ~T : 1uT = T (1vT ) for some permutation T ;
1u  1v , there is ~T  1 such that for all T  ~T : 1uT > T (1vT ) for some permutation T :
The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM. The swr < on X satises
all axioms exceptMC.
For an example violating only WPC, let < on X be the leximin dened in Bossert
et al. ([16]; p. 586). The swr < on X is not an extension of the leximin swr <LM.
The swr < on X satises all axioms except WPC. [To see that WPC is violated, for
all x,y 2 R, let rep (x; y)  (x; y; x; y; ::::) and consider the proles 1u =
 
1
2
; rep
 
1
4
; 1
8

and
1v =
 
3
4
; rep
 
0; 3
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
. Then, (1uT ; T+1 v)  1v; for all T 2 Nn f1g but 1u  1 v:].
8.2.2 Independence of axioms used in Theorem 5
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 5, we show that the axioms are tight.
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For an example violating only A, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u; 1v 2 X,
1u < 1v , u1  v1.
< is a swo on X and it satises all axioms except A.
For an example violating only WP, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u; 1v 2 X, 1u 
1v. < is a swo on X and it satises all axioms exceptWP.
For an example violating only PC, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u,1v 2 X,
1u < 1v , lim inf
t2N
ut  lim inf
t2N
vt.
< is a swo on X and it satises all axioms except PC. [To see that PC is violated, consider
the proles 1u = con0 and 1v = con1. By construction, (1uT ; T+1v)  1v for all T  2, but
1v  1u.]
Let the following notation hold for the next two examples. Dene X as follows:
X = f1u 2 Xj min
t2N
ut existsg.
For all 1u 2 X, let t(1u) be one of the generations such that ut(1u) = mint2N ut.
For an example violating only WHP, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u, 1v 2 X,
(i) if 1u, 1v 2 X, then 1u <1v , mint2N ut+inft2Nnft(1u)g ut2 
mint2N vt+inft2Nnft(1v)g vt
2
;
(ii) if 1u 2 X, 1v 2 XnX, then 1u <1v , mint2N ut+inft2Nnft(1u)g ut2  inft2N vt;
(iii) otherwise, 1u < 1v , inft2N ut  inft2N vt.
< is a swo on X and it satises all axioms except WHP. [To see that WHP is
violated, consider the proles 1u = (16 , con1), 1v = con
1
2
, 1u0 = (16 ;
1
2
, con1), and 1v0 = (12 ;
1
3
,
con
1
2
). By the denition of <, 1u  1v, but 1v0  1u0, which contradictsWHP.]
For an example violating only CONd1, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u, 1v 2 X,
(i) if inf
t2N
ut > inf
t2N
vt, then 1u  1v;
(ii) if 1u, 1v 2 X and ut(1u) = vt(1v), then 1u < 1v , inf
t2Nnft(1u)g
ut  inf
t2Nnft(1v)g
vt;
(iii) if 1u 2 XnX, 1v 2 X, and inf
t2N
ut = min
t2N
vt, then 1u  1v;
(iv) if 1u, 1v 2 XnX, and inf
t2N
ut = inf
t2N
vt, then 1u  1v.
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< is a swo on X and it satises all axioms except CONd1. [To see that CONd1 is
violated, consider the proles 1uk = ( 1k ; con
1
2
); k 2 N, and 1v = (0; con1). Observe that
1v 2 X, 1uk 2 X for all k 2 N and limk!1 1uk = (0; con 12) 2 X. By the denition of <,
1u
k < 1v for all k 2 N, but 1v  (0; con 12), which contradicts CONd1.]
For an example violating only C, dene < on X as follows: for all 1u,1v 2 X,
1u  1v , 1u =  (1v) for some  2 ;
1u  1v , there is  > 0 : 1u   (1v) + con, for some  2 .
< is a swr on X and it satises all axioms except C.
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